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Abstract
Untraceable communication is about hiding the iden-
tity of the sender or the recipient of a message. Cur-
rently most systems used in practice (e.g., TOR) rely
on the principle that a message is routed via sev-
eral relays to obfuscate its path through the network.
However, as this increases the end-to-end latency it
is not ideal for applications like Voice-over-IP (VoIP)
communication, where participants will notice annoy-
ing delays if the data does not arrive fast enough.
We propose an approach based on the paradigm
of Dining Cryptographer networks (DC-nets) that
can be used to realize untraceable communication
within small groups. The main features of our ap-
proach are low latency and resilience to packet-loss
and fault packets sent by malicious players. We con-
sider the special case of VoIP communication and
propose techniques for a P2P implementation. We
expose existing problems and sketch possible future
large-scale systems composed of multiple groups.
1 Introduction
A few decades ago telecommunications were mainly
realized using circuit switching, such that an elec-
trical signal carrying the audio information could be
sent from one correspondent to another. Nowadays
it is more common that speech is digitized and then
sent in small packets over a private network or over
the internet.
In such real-time VoIP communication the quality
of the user experience is dependent on the latency of
the network. While some package-loss can be toler-
ated, the one-way end-to-end latency should ideally
not exceed 150ms [1]. To this effect a stream of small
packets is sent at a fast pace, for instance around 50
packets per second [5].
We are interested to have a system in which two
users can communicate with each other via VoIP
anonymously to the others. That means these two
users know that they are speaking to each other, but
nobody else can infer who is communicating with
whom.
One approach would be to use an anonymisation
system like the well-known TOR network [9], or al-
ternatively one of the more recently proposed systems
like Drac [8] or Herd [19]. However, in all these sys-
tems the security is based on the principle that the
message is relayed several times on its way through
the network, so that it is hard to distinguish who is
the sender or the recipient of a message. One prob-
lem of this is that users have to trust the operators of
intermediary relays and mixes that they are honest
and do not disclose any information. Another prob-
lem is that this relaying increases the latency and
the jitter, which reduces the quality of phone calls or
video-conferences.
Another approach would be to use Dining Cryp-
tographer Networks (DC-nets). Here, messages are
not relayed but multiple players simultaneously send
ciphertexts to the recipient, and then the recipient
combines these ciphertexts to obtain a message. The
recipient knows that one of the players must have
sent the message, but he is not be able to distinguish
which one. As opposed to relay based systems like
TOR and mixing, the latency is lower, no central au-
thority is required and might therefore be interesting
for applications which require a low latency and for
P2P scenarios.
However, in classical DC-nets the recipient can
only recover the message once he has obtained all
the ciphertexts. Furthermore, all these ciphertexts
must be correct; if a malicious player provides faulty
data the recipient cannot recover the message. Thus,
if packets are late, lost or faulty, then no useful infor-
mation is transmitted.
In this paper, we propose a protocol that is based
on the paradigm of DC-nets but adapted for VoIP
streaming. It enables two players out of a group of
n players to communicate without disclosing to any-
body else that they are communicating. Our protocol
is resilient to packet-loss and to faulty packets, and
can be implemented using lightweight cryptography.
We study the performance, discuss practical imple-
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Figure 1: We want to enables two players Pa and Pb
out of a group of n players P1, ..., Pn to communicate
with VoIP in such a way that nobody except them
can distinguish which pair of the n · (n− 1) possible
pairs of players is communicating.
mentations and propose possible future work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe our model and our security requirements. In
Section 3, we derive our new protocol. In Section 4,
we discuss practical considerations, e.g. an imple-
mentation as a P2P protocol. In Section 5 we con-
sider the performance. In Section 6 we sketch possible
future work, and in Section 7 we review related work.
In Section 8 we conclude with some remarks.
2 Model and Definitions
We consider the case where two players want to com-
municate and stay anonymous w.r.t. to the others,
so our requirements are different from those of the
original DC-net protocol. In the original DC proto-
col the recipient does not know the identity of the
sender and the sender does not know the identity of
the recipient, but in our model we assume that the
two correspondent know each other’s identity.
2.1 Model
We assume a communication network with n players
P1, ..., Pn and an aggregator A, and we consider the
problem where two of these players, Pa and Pb, want
to communicate with each other such that nobody
else can see that they are communicating.
After an appropriate setup, the messages are ex-
changed in successive transmission rounds which con-
sist of two phases:
1. A collection phase where each player send data
to the aggregator.
2. A broadcast phase during which the aggregator
sends the aggregated data back to the partici-
pants.
This star topology is a well-known scheme for im-
plementing a DC-net in networks without physical
broadcast.
2.2 Security Properties
In this section we define the properties of correctness
and privacy we want to achieve.
Correctness We say that a protocol is correct if,
assuming the players Pa, Pb and the aggregator A
participate correctly, it holds that:
• if the message of Pa encoding ma reaches the ag-
gregator A in time and the result forwarded by
the aggregator A reaches Pb, then Pb can com-
pute ma; and
• if the message of Pb encoding mb reaches the
aggregator A in time and the result forwarded by
the aggregator reaches Pa, then Pa can compute
mb.
Thus, if the players Pa, Pb and the aggregator A be-
have correctly and their packets arrive timely, then
Pb and Pa can respectively recover ma and mb.
Privacy We say that a protocol is private if a
computationally bounded adversary controlling up to
n−3 players (other than Pa and Pb) and the aggrega-
tor A cannot determine who are the two correspon-
dents with a probability better than random guessing.
For a set of honest participants H ⊂ {P1, ..., Pn}
there are c = |H| ·(|H|−1) ·2−1 different pairs of cor-
respondents. Thus a protocol is private if the adver-
sary has a probability of guessing correctly the pair
of correspondents which is not better than a random
guess, i.e., with probability 1/c.
3 A Protocol for Untraceable
Streaming
To start we consider a simple protocol that meets
the requirements from the previous section in an ideal
situation and we progressively adapt it to end up with
a protocol that can be used in a real-world scenario.
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(a) Collection phase. Each player P1, ..., Pn sends a cipher-
text to the aggregator A. The ciphertexts of players Pa and
Pb encode respectively the messagesma andmb, whereas the
other ciphertexts are ’empty’. The aggregator A aggregates
the received ciphertexts.
Pa Pb
A
(mb,ma)(ma,mb)
(b) Broadcast phase. The aggregator A sends the result of
the aggregation back to all players P1, ..., Pn. From this the
players Pa and Pb can compute mb and ma.
Figure 2: We consider a system with n players P1, ..., Pn and an aggregator A, in which each transmission
round comprises a sending and a broadcast phase.
Protocol 1 A simple protocol based on DC-nets.
1. Setup: P1, ..., Pn respectively have secret keys
k1, ..., kn such that k1 + ... + kn = 0. Pa addi-
tionally has ma and Pb additionally has mb.
2. Collection phase: Every Pi for i 6= a, b sends
Oi = ki to A. Pa sends Oa = ka +ma to A. Pb
sends Ob = kb +mb to A.
3. Broadcast phase: A broadcasts X = O1+ ...+
On to P1, ..., Pn. Pa computes mb = X−ma and
Pb computes ma = X −mb.
In the description we assume that the setups for
the protocols have already been performed. Typi-
cally one of the correspondents will anonymously pro-
vide the other players with the required data using
an anonymous channel akin to [11, 6].
3.1 A Simple Protocol
We assume that during the execution of the protocol
• the number of players remains constant,
• no messages are lost (or arrive too late), and
• all players are honest.
In this situation two players Pa and Pb can commu-
nicate with each other in full-duplex using the classic
DC-net principle. This approach is described in de-
tail in Protocol 1. All players are initially provided
with secret keys k1, ..., kn that sum up to 0, so that
the keys will vanish when all ciphertexts are aggre-
gated. So if both Pa and Pb send during the same
round, the result forwarded by the aggregator is the
sum of their messages. By subtracting their own mes-
sage from this result they can recover each other’s
message.
The previous system obviously fails, if only one
user does not send anything or if his packet is lost.
This seems to be a very strong restriction of the pro-
tocol.
3.2 A Packet-Loss Resilient Protocol
The problem of packet-loss is that if the aggregator
does not receive all the packets, he can only make the
sum X over a strict subset of O1, ..., On. This means
that the keys will not cancel and Pa and Pb cannot
recover the messages like in the previous scenario.
To overcome this problem we can modify the pre-
vious protocol as shown in Protocol 2. During the
initialization Pa and Pb are provided with the keys
k1, ..., kn of all players. Further the aggregator does
not only broadcast the sum X, but also a list L in-
forming which packets he received. Said list L in-
forms the players Pa and Pb about which keys are
included in the partial sum and since they know all
the keys, they can subtract them from X and recover
the messages.
This leaves us with the problem of users who de-
liberately send faulty packets to disrupt the commu-
nication. Such a case should be caught and the cor-
responding packets should be dropped. To identify
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Protocol 2 A packet-loss resilient protocol.
1. Setup: P1, ..., Pn respectively have secret keys
k1, ..., kn. Pa additionally has ma and Pb addi-
tionally has mb, and both know all k1, ..., kn.
2. Collection phase: Each Pi for i 6= a, b sends
Oi = ki to A. Pa sends Oa = ka + ma to A.
Pb sends Ob = kb +mb to A. A receives Oi for
i ∈ L ⊆ {1, ..., n}.
3. Broadcast phase: A broadcasts (L,X) to
P1, ..., Pn, where X =
∑
i∈LOi. If b ∈ L then Pa
computes mb; with mb = X −
∑
i∈L ki −ma in
case a ∈ L or otherwise with mb = X−
∑
i∈L ki.
If a ∈ L then Pb computes ma; with ma =
X −∑i∈L ki − mb in case b ∈ L or otherwise
with ma = X −
∑
i∈L ki.
such packets, we propose the following protocol.
3.3 A Protocol Resilient to Lost and
Faulty Packets
The problem is that if a malicious player Pi sends a
random value instead of ki then Pa and Pb who expect
ki will not be able to properly extract the messages
ma and mb from X anymore.
In order to protect against such malicious players it
is obvious the aggregator must be able to distinguish
if a received packet is correct. However the aggrega-
tor should not be able to distinguish which packets
contain messages. Thus every player must include
a proof that the submitted data is correct, and the
aggregator must be able to verify this proof without
gaining any other information from it. This means
that a player Pi /∈ {Pa, Pb} must be able to prove
that Oi = ki, and Pa and Pb must keep the freedom
to send Oa = ka +ma and Ob = kb +mb.
An elegant way to achieve this is to bind each
player Pi to his key ki using a trapdoor commit-
ment, where the secret trapdoor information α is only
known to Pa and Pb. Then each player Pi /∈ {Pa, Pb}
can only open the commitment to the value ki, but
Pa and Pb who know α can open their commitments
to any value they like, that is to ka+ma and kb+mb.
In our description we use Pedersen commitments
[21] which are of the form c = grhk, and we assume
that the secret α = logg h is only known to Pa and
Pb.
Protocol 3 A packet-loss resilient protocol with ver-
ification.
1. Setup: P1, ..., Pn respectively have secret value
pairs (k1, r1), ..., (kn, rn). Pa additionally hasma
and Pb additionally has mb, and both know all
(k1, r1), ..., (kn, rn). A is provided with c1, ..., cn
where ci = grihki . Only Pa and Pb know logg h.
2. Collection phase: Each Pi sends (Oi, si) to A.
Each Pi for i 6= a, b uses Oi = ki and si = ri. Pa
uses Oa = ka +ma and si = ri −ma · logg h. Pb
uses Ob = kb +mb and si = ri −mb · logg h. A
receives (Oi, si) where additionally gsihOi = ci
holds for i ∈ L ⊆ {1, ..., n}.
3. Broadcast phase: A broadcasts (L,X) to
P1, ..., Pn, where X =
∑
i∈LOi. If b ∈ L then Pa
computes mb; with mb = X −
∑
i∈L ki −ma in
case a ∈ L or otherwise with mb = X−
∑
i∈L ki.
If a ∈ L then Pb computes ma; with ma =
X −∑i∈L ki − mb in case b ∈ L or otherwise
with ma = X −
∑
i∈L ki.
As shown in Protocol 3, during the setup the ag-
gregator is provided with a commitment for each ex-
pected Oi, and each player Pi is provided with the
corresponding secret pairs (ki, ri). Then, during the
collection phase, each participant Pi /∈ {Pa, Pb} must
send (ki, ri) to the aggregator, since without α he
cannot find any other pair (k′i, r′i) that corresponds
to the commitment. Pa and Pb can use α to com-
pute valid pairs (ka +ma, r′a) and (kb +mb, r′b). The
aggregator verifies for each received pair if it corre-
sponds to the commitment and rejects pairs that do
not. Thus only valid kis are used to compute X.
This scenario is good if there is only one transmis-
sion round, but the anonymous sending of c1, ..., cn
to A is expensive and does not scale well to multi-
ple rounds. Therefore we need a more efficient way
to provide the aggregator A with means for verifying
the data from the participants when there are multi-
ple transmission rounds.
3.4 A Protocol Resilient to Packet-
Loss and Malicious Players for
Multiple Rounds
In order to extend the previous protocol to multi-
ple transmission rounds, we propose to use Merkle
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trees [20]. For each player Pi we use a Merkle tree Ti
that allows to verify that a given commitment is valid
for a given round. It is then not necessary anymore to
provide the aggregator with a commitment for each
round, but it is sufficient to provide the aggregator
with the roots of the Merkle trees. As illustrated in
Figure 3, such a Merkle tree Ti can be constructed
from a sequence (k(1)i , r
(1)
i ), ..., (k
(J)
i , r
(J)
i ), which can
be derived from a secret seed Si.
So what changes compared to the preceding proto-
col is that the aggregator is provided with the roots
of the Merkel trees instead of the commitments, and
each player Pi is provided with a secret seed Si that
corresponds to a pseudorandom sequence. Then, dur-
ing the transmission phase each player Pi does not
only send (k(j)i , r
(j)
i ) but (k
(j)
i , r
(j)
i , Z
(j)
i ) where Z
(j)
i is
a proof the commitment corresponding to (k(j)i , r
(j)
i )
is the right one for round j (i.e., that it is at posi-
tion j in the sequence). The aggregator computes
a commitment and verifies using Z(j)i that it is cor-
rect. A detailed description of the protocol is shown
in Protocol 4.
It is easy to see that this protocol satisfies the prop-
erties of correctness and privacy defined in Section 2.
3.5 Variants of the Protocol
In order to recover the messages in presence of packet-
loss we proposed in Section 3.2 that the aggregator
should send the list of packets that have been received
along with the sum. This allows the receiver to di-
rectly compute the message. If one can assume that
only a few (e.g., 1 or 2) packets are lost per round,
one can also omit to send this list. The recipient can
then still recover the message by trying all the pos-
sible combinations of missing packets. This way the
packet length is reduced, however at the cost of a
more expensive computation at the recipient.
Similarly one could also completely omit the cryp-
tographic proof and go for a completely different
mechanism. The players Pa and Pb could, upon
detection of problems, use the anonymous channel
from the setup and ask the aggregator to publish all
the packets he received during a problematic round.
Since Pa and Pb know all the keys, they would di-
rectly distinguish who sent a faulty packet, and they
could anonymously ban those players from the group.
This optimistic approach would lead to shorter pack-
ets, but as the latency of the anonymous channel is
expected to be high, the stream would be interrupted
for a non negligible amount of time.
Protocol 4 A packet-loss resilient protocol with ver-
ification and multiple rounds.
1. Setup: For each round j ∈ {1, ..., J},
P1, ..., Pn respectively have secret value pairs
(k
(j)
1 , r
(j)
1 ), ..., (k
(j)
n , r
(j)
n ). Pa additionally has
m
(j)
a and Pb additionally has m
(j)
b , and
both know all (k(j)1 , r
(j)
1 ), ..., (k
(j)
n , r
(j)
n ). A
is provided with R1, ..., Rn the roots of
a merkle trees T1, ..., T2 constructed from
(c
(1)
1 , ..., c
(J)
1 ), ..., (c
(1)
n , ..., c
(J)
n ) where c
(j)
i =
gr
(j)
i hk
(j)
i . Only Pa and Pb know logg h.
2. Collection phase (round j): Each Pi sends
(O
(j)
i , s
(j)
i , z
(j)
i ) to A. Each Pi for i 6= a, b uses
O
(j)
i = k
(j)
i and s
(j)
i = r
(j)
i . Pa uses O
(j)
a =
k
(j)
a +m
(j)
a and s
(j)
i = r
(j)
i −m(j)a · logg h. Pb uses
O
(j)
b = k
(j)
b +m
(j)
b and s
(j)
i = r
(j)
i −m(j)b · logg h.
Further, z(j)i is a proof that c
(j)
i = g
r
(j)
i hk
(j)
i is
in the Merkle tree Ti at position j. A receives
(O
(j)
i , s
(j)
i , z
(j)
i ) where z
(j)
i proves that c
(j)
i =
gs
(j)
i hO
(j)
i is at position j in Ti, for i ∈ L(j) ⊆
{1, ..., n}.
3. Broadcast phase (round j): A broad-
casts (L(j), X(j)) to P1, ..., Pn, where X(j) =∑
i∈L(j) O
(j)
i . If b ∈ L(j) then Pa computes
m
(j)
b ; with m
(j)
b = X
(j) − ∑i∈L(j) k(j)i − m(j)a
in case a ∈ L(j) or otherwise with m(j)b =
X(j)−∑i∈L(j) k(j)i . If a ∈ L(j) then Pb computes
m
(j)
a ; with m
(j)
a = X(j) −∑i∈L(j) k(j)i −m(j)b in
case b ∈ L(j) or otherwise with m(j)a = X(j) −∑
i∈L(j) k
(j)
i .
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Figure 3: A Merkle tree Ti for the sequence of commitments c
(1)
i , ..., c
(J)
i of player Pi. The sequence of the
secret keys (k(1)i , r
(1)
i ), ..., (k
(J)
i , r
(J)
i ) can be pseudo-randomly generated from a secret seed S. The player Pi
can prove that the commitment c(j)i is at the position j in the sequence.
4 Practical considerations
In this section we discuss some aspects to consider in
a real implementation of the protocol.
Channel Setup Concerning the setup of the chan-
nel, we assumed so far that the initialization is per-
formed anonymously by one of the correspondents Pa
or Pb. This correspondent will provide all other play-
ers and the aggregator with the the required data via
an anonymous communication channel.
One way to implement such an anonymous chan-
nel is to use a DC-net. However, such a DC-net must
then be run periodically, since in general it is not
known in advance when a correspondent will want
to talk with another. The higher the frequency with
which such a DC-net is run, the better the user ex-
perience. But as each run consumes bandwidth, one
does not want to do this more often than necessary
either. So there is a tradeoff to be made between
bandwidth and user experience with this approach.
Another way to implement an anonymous channel
is to use a relay based approach like onion routing
(e.g. TOR). Here the problem is that the overall se-
curity provided by the system is only as strong as the
weakest link in the chain. The use of such a relay
based approach would weaken the overall security of
the system.
Channel Termination In the protocol of Sec-
tion 3.4 the number of rounds (and thus the length
of the call) is fixed during the setup of the channel.
If a call ends earlier the correspondents can actively
terminate the call by notifying the other players via
the same anonymous channel that they used to do
the initialization.
Load Distribution with P2P Especially for the
aggregator the computational costs and the band-
width requirements and can rise to non-negligible lev-
els, since they are proportional to the number of play-
ers. For instance if all packets are around 100 bytes
and if 100 players send 50 packet per second, the ag-
gregator must aggregate 5000 packets per second and
has a corresponding incoming and outgoing traffic of
4Mbps. Each participant would have an incoming an
outgoing traffic of 40 kbps.
In a P2P system one is not obliged to have only
one aggregator as illustrated in Figure 4a, but the
players can distribute this load between all of them
by successively have each one of them play the role of
the aggregator in a round robin fashion as illustrated
in Figure 4b. This way the load is more evenly dis-
tributed and for the same setup as in the preceding
example each player would have of around 80 kbps of
ignoring and outgoing traffic.
Synchronization All players should send their
packets such that they arrive at the aggregator prac-
tically at then same time, in order to minimize the
overall latency of a transmission. The aggregator will
only wait for a certain period of time before aggre-
gating the received data and sending the result to the
players. It is therefore important that the clocks of
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(a) Implementation with a dedicated aggregator: In each round
the same aggregator processes the data from all the partici-
pants.
(b) Implementation as a distributed P2P system: In each round
another party plays the role of the aggregator. Advantageously
this also mitigates the damage that dishonest aggregator can
cause.
Figure 4: Centralized and distributed systems.
the players are properly synchronized.
Cryptography The cryptographic assumption for
the commitments and the hashtables only needs to
hold for a short time. It is therefore possible to use
a lower security parameter than for digital signatures
that have to be secure for decades.
5 Performance
In this section we consider the latency, the bandwidth
and the computing complexity for some setups.
Latency Latency of packets in computer networks
is often assumed to follow a log-normal distribution,
e.g. in [17, 22]. This distribution defined by
Pr(t = x) =
1√
2pis2
· exp
(
(lnx− u)2
2s2
)
has a characteristic heavy tail, as shown shown in
Figure 5a. If we assume an average u = 0.97 and
a standard error s = 0.06, then the average time the
aggregator has to wait until all n independent cipher-
texts have arrived is given by
Pr(t < x)n =
(ˆ x
l=−∞
Pr(t = l)
)n
.
where n is the number of players. As shown in Fig-
ure 5b the cumulated latency increases with the num-
ber of players. In our case, we see that for n = 100
players we already have a latency increase of more
than 30ms.
Packet Loss Packet loss typically occurs in
bursts and can be modeled using the well known
Gilbert–Elliott (GE) channel [14, 10]. We estimate
the number of rounds during which no packet is lost
on its way to the aggregator, based on the probability
p that a packet is lost. The probability that a packet
is not lost is then 1 − p, and the probability that no
packet is lost is then
q = (1− p)n.
Figure 6 illustrates the number of rounds during
which at least one packet does not make it to the
aggregator for various values of p.
Bandwidth During one transmission round each of
the n players sends a packet to the aggregator, and
the aggregator sends a packet back to each player.
The total number of packets per second b(n) is thus
proportional to the number of players n. That is
b(n) = 2 · n− 1
f
,
where f is the number of rounds per second.
The load of the aggregator increases with the num-
ber of players.
In a P2P scenario where all players successively
play the role of the aggregator, the bandwidth usage
is distributed evenly amongst all players. Each player
will perform like a normal player for n-1 rounds, and
in one out of n rounds he will not have to send any-
thing, but he will have to broadcast the aggregated
data to the n − 1 other players. The bandwidth per
player p(n) is shown in Figure 7a. It can be computed
with
p(n) =
b
n
=
n− 1
n
· 2
f
∼ 2
f
.
Packet size Packets in our protocol are composed
of two parts, the audio payload on one hand and the
cryptographic overhead on the other hand.
The amount of audio data depends on the fre-
quency of the packets, on the quality (sampling fre-
quency, compression rate) of the sound and the num-
ber of sound channels (e.g., mono or stereo). For
voice transmission in mono this could be 50 packets
with 60 bytes per second per packet, but for high-end
music in stereo it will be significantly more.
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Figure 8: In an untraceable communication system
with groups, there is a whole group of potential cor-
respondents on either side of the line. Nobody ex-
cept the real correspondents – neither an external
observer, nor any other group member – can distin-
guish who is communicating with whom.
The amount of cryptographic data depends on the
strength of the cipher that is used. Since the cryp-
tographic assumption only has to hold during the
communication one can use lightweight cryptographic
primitives.
6 Future Work
There are basically two directions for future work, the
improvement of the protocol itself and the building
of larger systems composed of multiple groups.
Detection of Malicious Aggregators In this pa-
per we assume that the aggregator is honest but cu-
rious. This means that he will not drop packets, nor
omit to send packets. While he cannot send wrong
results and remain undetected, he can just disrupt a
transmission round by just dropping data. A more
powerful malicious aggregator could however just ig-
nore some of the packets he receives, or he could
deliberately not broadcast the aggregated result to
anybody. In a P2P setting the effect of such an ag-
gregator can be mitigated using the rotation principle
proposed in section X, but ideally one would like to
detect and to ban such aggregators from the group.
Larger Systems with Multiple Groups Pro-
tocols based on DC-net do not scale to a very large
number of participants, as the bandwidth and the
computational power used by the aggregator are pro-
portional to the number of participants. So the idea
which was already proposed in [15] is to realize sys-
tems composed of many small groups, as illustrated
in Figure 8. Only the correspondents will know
that they are communicating, all other players or ob-
servers cannot distinguish who is communicating.
For example one could have on one side a group of
500 politicians and on the other side a group of 500
journalists. When a politician then talks to a jour-
nalist, it would only be possible to see that one of
the 500 politicians is talking to one of the 500 jour-
nalists, but it would not be possible for anybody to
distinguish which politician is talking to which jour-
nalist. As there would be 500 ·500 = 250000 different
possibilities, such a system would offer a fairly good
protection.
There are many open questions, such as: How can
we locate a given participant within the system, if we
do not know in which group he is? How can we handle
participants joining and leaving the system? How can
we ban malicious participants from the entire system?
7 Related Work
The Dining Cryptographers protocol was proposed in
[4] and further studied in [3, 2, 23, 24]. A first system
composed of multiple DC-nets was proposed in [15].
Computationally secure DC-net protocols with
zero-knowledge verification of the data have been pro-
posed in [16] and further studied in [11, 25, 6, 12, 7].
Recent group based communication systems in-
clude [7, 18, 19, 8]. There have also been TOR [9]
extensions for VoIP [13] and for group communica-
tion [26].
8 Concluding Remarks
Starting from the classic DC-net paradigm we de-
rived a protocol for untraceable VoIP telephony that
is resilient against packet-loss and faulty packets. It
enables two players within a larger group to commu-
nicate with VoIP without anybody else being able
to distinguish that they are communicating. Further
we discussed practical issues and showed how to dis-
tribute the load in a P2P network.
We consider this work a first step towards larger
systems composed of multiple groups so that can scale
to a larger number of participants.
8
(a) Latency of a packet. (b) Average latency of the last packet.
Figure 5: Latency of arrival of the packets at the aggregator.
Figure 6: Ratio of rounds in which no packet is lost on its way to the aggregator.
(a) Packets sent per participant. (b) Total number of packets sent.
Figure 7: Bandwidth
9
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